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I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost exactly two hundred and thirty years after the enactment of 
the Copyright Act of 1790,1 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that copyright 
protections do not apply to Georgia’s official annotated code.2 In so doing, 
the Court expanded the rule it adopted in its first copyright case, Wheaton 
v. Peters, which prevents judges from copyrighting their written opinions 
and transferring them to the court’s reporter of decisions, to its most recent 
copyright case.3 In Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., the Court’s 
majority ruled that the nineteenth-century era government edicts doctrine 
also excludes works created by legislators, acting in the course of their 
legislative duties, from copyright protection.4 
This Paper begins with an overview of the facts and history of 
Public.Resource.Org,5 including a review of the various stakeholders and 
                                                           
ǂ Andy Taylor is a student in Mitchell Hamline School of Law’s part-time evening program. 
From 2010–2019, Andy was a policy staffer in the U.S. House of Representatives, where he 
served in senior positions for two members of Congress and on the staff of the Financial 
Services Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee. He currently works in digital legal 
operations and data privacy for a Midwest-based lending company and serves on the board 
of directors of the Borgen Project, a non-profit organization that works to make poverty 
reduction a focus of U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, Andy is a Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA)  Dispute Resolution Arbitrator and a Certified Information 
Privacy Manager (CIPM). 
1 Copyright Act of 1790, 124, 1st Cong. § 1 (1790). 
2 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1504 (2020). 
3 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 668 (1834). 
4 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1508. 
5 Infra Section II.A. 
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their interests in the case.6 An analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling 
follows.7 The analysis evaluates the rule adopted by the majority and 
compares it to the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit. In particular, 
this Paper questions the Court’s emphasis on the construct of “author” 
under the Copyright Act in determining whether a work is a law.8 Although 
both courts found for Public.Resource.Org, this Paper argues that the victor 
would have been better off with the framework the Eleventh Circuit used to 
conclude that the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA”) was 
uncopyrightable under the government edicts doctrine.9  
Finally, this Paper explores what “law” is and the implications of the 
Court’s approach to this question (at least in the context of copyright) on 
separate but related litigation to which Public.Resource.Org is a party. In 
short, the decision is a win for the general principle that no one owns the 
law, but it does not go so far as to free up the “raw materials” of democracy 
as Public.Resource.Org and its supporters might have hoped. This has 
implications for closely connected legal and policy disputes over the 
copyrightability of privately authored standards later incorporated by 
reference into federal, state, and local law. 
II. THE PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
It is long settled that law is not copyrightable.10 A trio of cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in the 1800s addressed questions of 
copyright in the context of judicial decisions.11 In Wheaton v. Peters, the 
official reporter of the Supreme Court unsuccessfully argued it had been 
                                                           
6 Infra Section II.C. 
7 Infra Section II.B. 
8 Infra Sections III.A–B. 
9 Infra Section III.C. 
10 See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright 
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 723 (1989); 
Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-Like Controls over 
Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1000–02 (1995); Deborah Tussey, 
Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 174 (1998); Michael W. Carroll, Open Access Publishing and the 
Future of Legal Scholarship: The Movement for Open Access Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 741, 742 (2006); Katie Fortney, Ending Copyright Claims in State Primary Legal 
Materials: Toward an Open Source Legal System, 102 L. LIBR. J. 59, 61 (2010); Beth Ford, 
Open Wide the Gates of Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 540 (2014); Elizabeth Scheibel, 
No Copyright in the Law: A Basic Principle, yet a Continuing Battle, 7 CYBARIS 350 (2016); 
Leslie A. Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? We Must Restore Public 
Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26:2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 206 (2019). 
11 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); 
Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). 
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gifted a copyright in the judicial opinions it reported.12 Unpersuaded, the 
Court ruled “that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written 
opinions delivered by this court: and the judges thereof cannot confer on 
any reporter any such right.”13 Some five decades later, the Court heard a 
similar case concerning the copyrightability of state judicial opinions. In 
Banks v. Manchester, the Court elaborated on its Wheaton ruling, 
“explaining that ‘the judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion 
or decision, the statement of the case and the syllabus or head note’ cannot 
‘be regarded as their author or their proprietor, in the sense of [the 
Copyright Act].’”14 However, in Callaghan v. Myers, the Court upheld a 
reporter’s copyright claim over “the matter which is the result of his 
intellectual labor.”15 
The aforementioned cases comprise the government edicts 
doctrine.16 According to the majority in Public.Resource.Org:  
These cases establish a straightforward rule: Because 
judges are vested with the authority to make and interpret 
the law, they cannot be the “author” of the works they 
prepare “in the discharge of their judicial duties.” This rule 
applies both to binding works (such as opinions) and to 
non-binding works (such as headnotes and syllabi). It does 
not apply, however, to works created by government 
officials (or private parties) who lack the authority to make 
or interpret the law, such as court reporters.17 
While these cases long-ago addressed the copyrightability (or lack 
thereof) of judge-made law, and modern cases have similarly held that state 
statutes and local ordinances lack copyright protection,18 
Public.Resource.Org presented a new question for the Court concerning 
                                                           
12 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 614–15. 
13 Id. at 668. 
14 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506 (2020) (quoting Banks, 128 
U.S. at 253). 
15 See Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 645, 647 (recognizing all but the opinions of the court as 
copyrightable, including a title-page, a statement of the entry of copyright, a list of the judges 
composing the court, a table of the cases reported in the volume, in alphabetical order, a 
head-note or syllabus to each opinion, with the names of the respective counsel, and their 
arguments in some cases, a statement of facts, and an index, arranged alphabetically, and 
consisting substantially of a reproduction of the head-notes). 
16 Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Peter S. Menell, The Uncopyrightability of Edicts of 
Government, PENN LAW: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1, 3 (2019), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3113&context=faculty_schola
rship [https://perma.cc/2BDC-HUYY]. 
17 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1507 (internal citations omitted). 
18 See Davidson v. Wheelock, 27 F. 61 (C.C.D. Minn. 1866); Howell v. Miller, 9 F. 129 (6th 
Cir. 1898); Bldg. Off. & Code Admin. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980); 
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
3
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the copyrightability of annotated law. The issue arose out of a dispute 
between Georgia’s Code Revision Commission (OCGA)—an arm of the 
state’s General Assembly—and Public.Resource.Org, a “one-man”19 non-
profit dedicated to “making government information more accessible.”20  
The Commission was originally established in 1977 to organize 
Georgia’s statutes into a single code.21 State law expressly distinguishes 
between the “statutory portion” of the OCGA and the annotated portions.22 
The legislature was also careful to note that “[a]ll historical citations, title 
and chapter analyses, and notes set out in [the OCGA] are given for the 
purpose of convenient reference and do not constitute part of the law.”23 In 
2006, the Commission contracted with Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., a 
division of the LexisNexis Group, to assemble “not only the statutory 
provisions, but also ‘annotations, captions, catchlines, headings, history 
lines, editorial notes, cross-references, indices, title and chapter analyses, 
research references, amendment notes, Code Commission notes, and other 
material related to or included in such Code at the direction of the 
Commission.’”24 The work for hire25 contract “state[d] that any copyright in 
the OCGA vests exclusively in ‘the State of Georgia, acting through the 
Commission.’”26 While the contract required LexisNexis to make a free 
version of the unannotated code available on its website, it gave LexisNexis 
the exclusive right “to publish and sell the [annotated OCGA] as a printed 
publication, on CD–ROM and in an online version.”27 By some accounts, 
LexisNexis sold copies of the OCGA for prices ranging from $404 to 
$1,200.28   
                                                           
19 Steven Levy, The Internet’s Own Instigator, WIRED (Sep. 12, 2016, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/09/the-internets-own-instigator/ [https://perma.cc/7KCZ-
CF7X]. 
20 PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, https://public.resource.org/ [https://perma.cc/RJM7-ZA7Q].  
21 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1504. 
22 GA. CODE. ANN. § 1-1-1 (2021). 
23 Id. § 1-1-7. 
24 Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1353 (N.D. 
Ga. 2017), rev'd, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018), aff'd, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 
140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020). 
25 The Copyright Act of 1976 defines “work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment,” for which the employer is “considered 
the author” for copyright purposes. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (2021). 
“Unless the parties expressly provide otherwise in a written agreement, the employer initially 
‘owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.’” Brief for the United States as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 
(2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4167076 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for U.S. Supporting 
Petitioner]. 
26 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1505. 
27 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354. 
28 Molly Davis, Supreme Court Should Stop Georgia from Charging Citizens $404 per Year 
to Read Their Own Laws,  THE FEDERALIST (Nov. 6, 2019), 
4
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In defiance of takedown notices,29 Public.Resource.Org “printed 
volumes and supplements of the [OCGA], scanned them all, and then 
posted those copies on its website.”30 The organization even went so far as 
to mail digital copies of the OCGA directly to Georgia state legislators, in a 
brazen attempt to stir controversy.31 In 2015, the Commission filed suit 
against Public.Resource.Org for copyright infringement and sought 
injunctive relief.32 In its complaint, Georgia’s lawyers likened 
Public.Resource.Org’s actions to a “strategy of mass publication 
terrorism.”33 The district court found for the Commission but noted the 
“unusual” nature of the case.34 The trial judge relied on the fact that the 
Copyright Act lists,35 and case law recognizes,36 annotations as works entitled 
to copyright protection. Furthermore, the judge’s opinion noted that “the 
United States Copyright Office’s own treatise expressly recognizes the 
protectability of annotations.”37 
After losing in federal district court, Public.Resource.Org found a 
more favorable result on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Writing for a 
unanimous court, Judge Marcus held that: 
[T]he annotations in the OCGA are sufficiently law-like so 
as to be properly regarded as a sovereign work . . . . For 
                                                           
https://thefederalist.com/2019/11/06/supreme-court-should-stop-georgia-from-charging-
citizens-404-per-year-to-read-their-own-laws/ [https://perma.cc/AV86-4AUY]; Josephine 
Wolff, Supreme Court Says State Laws Aren’t Copyrightable, SLATE (Apr. 29, 2020, 3:41 
PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/04/georgia-state-law-copyright-lexis-nexis-supreme-
court.html [https://perma.cc/Q2QY-D5VP]. 
29 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, established a “notice-and-
takedown system [which] allows rightsholders to send a notification to [an] online service 
provider regarding infringing material that appears on the service provider’s system.” Section 
512 of Title 17: Resources on Online Service Provider Safe Harbors and Notice-and-
Takedown System, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/512/ 
[https://perma.cc/KW8R-AZCB]. 
30 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354. 
31 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/amicus/public-
access/publicresourceorg/ [https://perma.cc/XHQ2-WCB4]. 
32 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1354. 
33 Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 12, Code Revision Comm’n v. 
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (N.D.Ga. 2017) (No. 1:15-CV-02594-
MHC 2015), 2015 WL 10008314; see also Adam Liptak, Accused of ‘Terrorism’ for Putting 
Legal Materials Online, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/us/politics/georgia-official-code-copyright.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q64E-694F]. 
34 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (“[M]ost official codes are not annotated 
and most annotated codes are not official.”). 
35 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
36 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869); W.H. Anderson Co. v. 
Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928). 
37 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §§ 313.6(C)(2), 717.1 (3d ed. 2014)). 
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purposes of the Copyright Act, this means that the People 
are the constructive authors of those official legal 
promulgations of government that represent an exercise of 
sovereign authority. And because they are the authors, the 
People are the owners of these works, meaning that the 
works are intrinsically public domain material and, 
therefore, uncopyrightable.38  
Reasoning that the “ultimate inquiry is whether a work is authored 
by the People,” the court relied on three “critical markers,” namely 
“the identity of the public officials who created the work, 
the authoritativeness of the work, and the process by which the work was 
created.”39 
Georgia, on behalf of the Commission, petitioned the Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari.40 It was supported by the United States41 and 
thirteen states (plus the District of Columbia).42 Unusually, 
Public.Resource.Org “acquiesced” in Georgia’s writ, stating that “because it 
is frequently sued [it] needs a clear rule governing when and to what extent 
it can post official codes adopted by state legislatures.”43 
B. U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision 
Writing for an ideologically diverse majority, Chief Justice Roberts 
(joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh) upheld the 
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling, “though for reasons distinct from those relied on 
by the Court of Appeals.”44 The Court rejected the “three markers” test 
employed by the circuit court, instead finding that “careful examination of 
our government edicts precedents reveals a straightforward rule based on 
                                                           
38 Code Revision Comm’n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 
F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2018). 
39 Id. at 1232 (emphasis omitted). 
40 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 
(2020) (No. 18-1150). 
41 See Amicus Brief for U.S. Supporting Petitioner, supra note 25 at 14, “[j]ust as an official 
court reporter is the ‘author’ of annotations he prepares to accompany judicial opinions, so 
too is [Georgia’s Code Revision Commission] the ‘author’ of statutory annotations that the 
entity either prepares or has prepared for it as a work made for hire,” which entitles the 
Commission to copyright protections of the annotations. Id. 
42 Brief for the States of Arkansas, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Georgia 
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4235530 
[hereinafter Amicus Brief for Arkansas, et al.] (“By invalidating [Georgia’s] copyrights, the 
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of copyright law . . . would threaten the continued 
production of official annotated state codes.”). 
43 Brief of Respondent at *15, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) 
(No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 5188978. 
44 Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1506. 
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the identity of the author.”45 As a result, the majority expanded the scope of 
the government edicts doctrine, holding that “copyright does not vest in 
works that are (1) created by judges and legislators (2) in the course of their 
judicial and legislative duties.”46 A review of the facts led the Court to 
conclude that the Commission is an arm of the state legislature.47 Satisfied 
that the OCGA is an original work of authorship of the Commission acting 
within the course and scope of the legislature’s official duties, the majority 
therefore concluded that “Georgia’s annotations are not copyrightable.”48 
In separate dissenting opinions, Justice Thomas and Justice 
Ginsburg argued that Georgia had a copyright interest in its annotated code, 
albeit for reasons as distinct as those put forward by the majority and Court 
of Appeals for why Georgia did not have a copyright interest.49 Writing on 
behalf of Justice Alito and Justice Breyer,50 Justice Thomas took issue with 
the majority’s “unwillingness to examine the root of a precedent”51 and 
charged the Roberts opinion with “textual deficiencies.”52 In particular, 
Justice Thomas found no basis for wholesale exclusion of copyright 
protections for legislative works based solely on the construction of 
“authorship.”53 In essence, he would have upheld the annotations authored 
by LexisNexis in the same way the Court upheld a reporter’s copyright claim 
in Callaghan.54 He also rejected the majority’s public policy argument that 
upholding Georgia’s copyright claim would result in an “economy class” 
version of the unannotated code online and a separate annotated code 
available at a price to “first class” readers.55 Instead, Justice Thomas posited 
that “[t]he inability to access the OCGA merely deprives a researcher of one 
                                                           
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1508. 
47 Id. at 1504–05. Facts that the majority found persuasive in its opinion include: (1) the 
legislature established the Commission; (2) the majority of the Commission’s members are 
legislators; (3) the Commission is funded through appropriations provided for the legislative 
branch; (4) the Commission is staffed by the Office of Legislative Counsel; (5) the 
Commission is constitutionally within the sphere of the legislature’s authority; and (6) the 
Commission’s proposed statutory text and annotations are submitted annually to the 
legislature for approval. Id. 
48 Id. at 1508. 
49 Id. at 1518, 1523 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
50 Justice Breyer joined the dissent authored by Justice Thomas for all but Part II–A and 
footnote 6. Id. at 1513. 
51 Id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 1520 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
53 See id. at 1519–20 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. at 1517–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Conclud[ing] that, as with the privately created 
annotations in Callaghan, Georgia’s statutory annotations at issue in this case are 
copyrightable.”). 
55 Id. at 1512. 
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specific tool, not to the underlying factual or legal information summarized 
in that tool.”56 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a separate 
dissenting opinion essentially endorsing the majority’s expansion of the 
government edicts doctrine to encompass works that are created by 
legislators in the course of their legislative duties.57 Nonetheless, the 
dissenting Justices would have held Georgia’s copyright claim valid based 
on their argument that the OCGA was not authored in the course of the 
General Assembly’s legislative duties.58 To elucidate this point, the Justices 
noted that (1) the annotations are created post-enactment of the statutes 
passed by the legislature, (2) the “annotations are descriptive rather than 
prescriptive,” and (3) the annotations “aim to inform the citizenry at large . 
. . [as opposed to] those seated in legislative chambers.”59  
For Supreme Court watchers, the Public.Resource.Org decision is 
noteworthy because of the unique judicial groupings that comprised both 
the majority and dissenting opinions. Not only did the majority make up a 
divergent cross-section of justices appointed by Presidents George W. Bush, 
Obama, and Trump, but the pairing of Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer 
in a joint dissent was perhaps just as surprising. Though both were 
considered “liberal” members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg and Justice 
Breyer repeatedly found themselves on opposite sides of copyright cases 
throughout their overlapping careers on the Court.60 Justice Ginsburg was 
described as “the high court’s most fervently pro-copyright voice” who 
“carried the big pen” on numerous copyright cases.61 Justice Breyer, on the 
other hand, has a long history of copyright skepticism, even preceding his 
                                                           
56 Id. at 1517–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 1522–23 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 1523 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
59 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (distinguishing codified statutes passed by the legislature from 
other works passed by a legislature, such as a guide to the state capitol commissioned by the 
Assembly of Georgia). 
60 Ryan Davis, Ginsburg Remembered as Steadfast Pro-Copyright Voice, LAW 360 (Sept. 21, 
2020, 11:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1312244/ginsburg-remembered-as-
steadfast-pro-copyright-voice [https://perma.cc/J7E7-HBLN] (“While the public generally 
views the Supreme Court through a polarized and partisan lens, intellectual property cases 
tend not to break along those lines.”). Justice Ginsburg’s “most frequent sparring partner on 
copyright issues was Justice Stephen Breyer, with whom she was ideologically aligned on 
most other major issues but who takes a more skeptical view of copyrights and intellectual 
property.” Id. 
61 Eriq Gardener, A Supreme Court Without RBG May Impact Hollywood’s Grip on 
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time on the bench.62 It is therefore remarkable that these two Justices agreed 
with the majority on the applicable rule, disagreed with the majority on the 
application of the rule to the facts of the case before the Court, and agreed 
with one another that copyright protection should have been extended to 
the OCGA.63 
C. Understanding the Stakeholders’ Interests 
For some, reading the majority and dissenting opinions of this case 
will leave them asking, “what is the point?” Legislative annotations and the 
organization of information about state statutes might strike even the most 
eager law student as a bit technical or abstruse. Therefore, before turning to 
an analysis of the Public.Resource.Org decision and the copyrightability of 
the law, it is important to first understand the various stakeholders and their 
interests in the Court’s decision. The following overview of 
Public.Resource.Org and select amici curiae who filed briefs in support of 
Public.Resource.Org and Georgia frames the consequences of this case and 
other cases involving related questions of copyright protection for law-like 
works. 
1. What is Public.Resource.Org? 
Public.Resource.Org is the brainchild of Carl Malamud, the 
organization’s only staffer, who has been at the forefront of several efforts 
to bring public records into the public domain.64 In the early 1990s, 
Malamud copied and compiled Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) data about publicly traded companies, including annual reports, 
proxy statements and other documents and made them available on the 
internet for free.65 He then coaxed the SEC into eventually running the 
                                                           
62 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970) (“[T]he evidence 
now available suggests that, although we should hesitate to abolish copyright protection, we 
should equally hesitate to extend or strengthen it.”). In a speech delivered more than forty 
years after the publication of his article challenging copyright expansionism, Justice Breyer 
explained that he had endeavored to examine the application of the Coase Theorem to the 
field of copyright, which was the idea “that if there were no costs of distributing property 
rights, and no costs of engaging in transactions with regard to those property rights, then the 
initial distribution of rights would not matter, because no matter what that was, people would 
exchange rights to get what they wanted.” Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: 
A Look Back Across Four Decades, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1635, 1636–37 (2011). 
63 See Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1523 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
64 Clint Hendler, Carl Malamud, Public Printer, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Mar. 13, 2009), 
https://archives.cjr.org/campaign_desk/carl_malamud_public_printer.php 
[https://perma.cc/FK5T-6S8D]. 
65 Id.  
9
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database,66 now known as EDGAR.67 Malamud’s work was “praised by the 
White House and public interest groups as a model of public dissemination 
of government data in the computer age.”68 He has been involved with 
similar efforts regarding the federal patents database, the opinions of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals,69 and congressional hearings.70 
As Malamud explained in an interview, his “goal has always been 
policy change.”71 In 2009, Malamud attempted to shape policy from inside 
the government when he launched a celebrated, albeit unsuccessful, 
campaign to run the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO).72 If 
nominated and confirmed, Malamud pledged to “radically change how [the 
GPO] present[s] information on the Internet,” by “enshrining principles of 
bulk data distribution into legislation.”73  
Following his failed bid for Public Printer, Malamud continued his 
decades-long efforts to make the law and law-like information available for 
free access online. In addition to the Georgia state code, Malamud copied 
                                                           
66 An Internet Access to S.E.C. Filings to End Oct. 1, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/12/business/an-internet-access-to-sec-filings-to-end-oct-
1.html [https://perma.cc/G2RZ-8NNF]. Malamud told consumers of the data to contact the 
SEC if they wanted to continue to have access and argued that the Paperwork Reduction Act 
required agencies with public records stored electronically to provide “timely and equitable 
access” in an “efficient, effective and economical manner.” Id. After numerous requests from 
users of the data, the SEC agreed to operate the database. Id. This outcome represents a 
model that Malamud has pushed repeatedly through his work: challenging government to 
do the work of generating and supporting the continued provision of public materials rather 
than relying on the private sector. Id. 
67 About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/about 
[https://perma.cc/XH8A-JVNC]. The Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) system “benefits investors, corporations, and the U.S. economy overall by 
increasing the efficiency, transparency, and fairness of the securities markets. Id. The system 
processes about 3,000 filings per day, serves up 3,000 terabytes of data to the public annually, 
and accommodates 40,000 new filers per year on average.” Id.  
68 Same-Day Internet Access to S.E.C. Filings, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/01/business/same-day-internet-access-to-sec-filings.html 
[https://perma.cc/R52C-Z5MA] (noting before EDGAR, “[a] single document [could] cost 
more than $50 if acquired through private companies that sell government data to the 
public.”). 
69 Levy, supra note 19. 
70 James Fallows, Another Win for Carl Malamud (or: News You Won’t See in the May 2007 




71 Hendler, supra note 64. 
72 Tim Jones, Yes We Scan: Carl Malamud for Public Printer, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Mar. 2, 2009) https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/yes-we-scan [https://perma.cc/GV6N-
FNSJ]. 
73 Prepared Statement by Carl Malamud, YES WE SCAN, 
https://yeswescan.org/index.gpo.html [https://perma.cc/PG8U-FFTP]. 
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and redistributed codes from Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, and Mississippi, 
as well as various municipal ordinances.74 Unlike its dispute with Georgia, 
no formal legal action was taken against the organization by other 
governments.75  
Separately, Public.Resource.Org became embroiled in a protracted 
legal battle with standards developing organizations (SDOs) over 
Public.Resource.Org’s copying and redistribution of standards developed 
by private SDOs, which were later incorporated by reference into law.76 In 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Malamud—sitting next to 
a representative of the American National Standards Institute77—implored 
Congress to amend the Copyright Act to declare that “[e]dicts of 
government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative 
enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not 
copyrightable for reasons of public policy.”78 Malamud defined edicts of 
government as “the rules of general applicability by which we choose to 
govern ourselves as a society.”79 
2. Stakeholders that Supported Public.Resource.Org 
Amici curiae who filed briefs in favor of Public.Resource.Org can 
be generally categorized as (1) disruptive legal research platforms, (2) public 
interest and open technology organizations, and (3) academics. The first two 
categories are addressed here. 
The legal technology industry has seen profound growth in a short 
amount of time. In 2014, over thirty percent of legal tech platforms that 
participated in the American Bar Association’s Techshow were “first 
timers” best described as legal startups.80 From 2016 through 2018, the 
industry saw a whopping 713 percent growth in investment, primarily driven 
                                                           
74 An Edicts of Government Amendment: Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law Before 
the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. 4 (2014) [hereinafter Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law] (statement of Carl 
Malamud, Public.Resource.Org). 
75 Id. 
76 See Freeing the Law with Public.Resource.Org, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/cases/publicresource-freeingthelaw [https://perma.cc/JSW5-SGZC]. 
77 About ANSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., https://ansi.org/about/introduction 
[https://perma.cc/G3SG-3SUN]. “The American Standard Institute (ANSI) is a private, non-
profit organization that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standards and 
conformity assessments system.” Id. Its membership includes SDOs. Id.  
78 Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 74 at 15; see also Banks v. 
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (“The question is one of public policy.”). 
79 Hearings on Review of U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 74 at 2. 
80 Jobst Elster, Start Me Up . . . I’ll Never Stop, LEGAL IT TODAY (June 10, 2015). 
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by electronic discovery and legal research needs.81 While the term “legal 
tech” is broad and extends well beyond research platforms, the growth in 
the market threatens the duopoly (real or perceived) that Westlaw and 
LexisNexis (referred collectively by the portmanteau “Wexis”)82 have long 
enjoyed.83 
Casetext, Docket Alarm, Fastcase, Free Law Project, Internet 
Archive, Judicata, Justia, and UniCourt are among the disruptive legal tech 
platforms that challenge the Wexis duopoly. In their amicus brief to the 
Court, these “next-generation legal research and analytics platforms and 
databases” argued that “an overbroad application of copyright to core legal 
materials will harm innovation, competition, and the public interest.”84 
These organizations did not offer a specific test or rule for the Court to 
consider but insisted that it must include the “legal core”—that is, “legal 
information that has been created, adopted, or imbued with the authority, 
imprimatur, or sanction of the state.”85 In their view, this necessarily requires 
unimpeded public “access to a wider set of information than just statutes 
and judicial opinions.”86 Further, these organizations rejected petitioner’s 
argument that only legal materials carrying the binding force of law can be 
covered by the government edicts doctrine because “some legal information 
carries sufficient authority or involvement of the state that it becomes just as 
essential as statutes and opinions in the actual operation of the law and 
governmental institutions.”87 
Public interest and open technology organizations shared the legal 
technology industry’s concern that the Court might determine that the 
OCGA falls outside of the scope of the government edicts doctrine but 
                                                           
81 Valentin Pivavorav, 713% Growth: Legal Tech Set an Investment Record in 2018, FORBES 
(Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/valentinpivovarov/2019/01/15/legaltechinvestment2018/?sh=3
d1ddc737c2b [https://perma.cc/W3LR-PHPW]. Investment spiked from $224 million to 
over $1.6 billion in two years. Id. 
82 See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TheLaw.Net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (S.D. Ohio 2003) 
(denying motion to dismiss West’s trademark dilution claim over reference to the “Wexis 
duopoly” on defendant’s website). 
83 LAC GRP., LexisNexis Versus Westlaw Revisited (Feb. 22, 2018), https://lac-
group.com/blog/lexisnexis-versus-westlaw-revisited/ [https://perma.cc/22DR-XURH] 
(“While Westlaw and Lexis continue to be at the top, their grip on market dominance has 
continued to loosen with the entrance of technology startups that are both well-funded and 
agile.”). 
84 Brief of Amici Curiae Next-Generation Legal Rsch. Platforms and Databases in Support 
of Respondent, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 
2019 WL 5305481, at *1 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Next-Generation and Databases] 
(emphasis added). 
85 Id. at *4. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at *5. 
12
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss3/4
2021] COPYRIGHT LAW CANNOT COPYRIGHT LAW 989 
lacked consensus over whether the OCGA was binding law. For example, 
the Internet Association—representing dozens of companies that make open 
government data available for public use—urged the Court not to limit the 
doctrine to government documents that impose binding legal obligations.88 
This may suggest that the Internet Association lacked confidence that 
Georgia’s annotated code carries the full force of law. On the other hand, 
the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Cato Institute 
centered their amicus brief arguments on the premise that all people must 
have access to the laws that bind them, indicating that they may not have 
thought the binding effect of the OCGA was in question.89  
Despite the discrepancy over the binding effect of the OCGA, this 
category of amici supporting Public.Resource.Org agreed that the OCGA 
is, at a minimum, authoritative.90 Additionally, they took umbrage with the 
commercialization of law and law-like materials online. In their amicus 
brief,  Cato and CDT—an organization which advocates for an open, 
decentralized internet—argued that individual privacy and autonomy is 
harmed when authoritative government documents are only accessible in 
exchange for sensitive data, which LexisNexis collects from users when they 
visit the company’s website to view the OCGA.91 Similarly, the Internet 
Association noted that “[t]his places the public’s access to the only website 
that hosts the official version of the law at the mercy of business and 
technical choices made by a contractor like Lexis for its own commercial 
reasons.”92 
Collectively, the stakeholders that filed briefs in support of 
Public.Resource.Org saw the case as a fundamental issue of democracy and 
endeavored to push the bounds of the  ;lkj government edicts doctrine to 
cover any authoritative government document, regardless of its legal binding 
effect. Underneath the legal arguments, the disruptive legal research 
platforms were also motivated by an interest in breaking the backbone of a 
commercial arrangement between states and major incumbent legal 
databases, like LexisNexis, which impedes their ability to penetrate the 
market and make like material available on their own platforms for free. 
                                                           
88 Brief of Amicus Curiae Internet Ass’n Supporting Respondent, Georgia v. 
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 5290509, at *11 
[hereinafter Amicus Brief of Internet Ass’n] (arguing that this would be an unmanageable 
rule because “[n]ot all sources of legal authority set forth binding legal obligations”). 
89 Brief of the Ctr. for Democracy and Tech. and Cato Inst. As Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 
2019 WL 5290510, at *2 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of CDT and Cato Inst.]. 
90 Id. at *3; Amicus Brief of Internet Ass’n, supra note 88, at *1–3. 
91 Amicus Brief of CDT and Cato Inst., supra note 89, at *20. 
92 Amicus Brief of Internet Ass’n, supra note 88, at *6–7. 
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3. Stakeholders that Supported Georgia 
Georgia’s position was supported in amicus briefs filed by (1) the 
U.S. Copyright Office (on behalf of the United States), (2) states with work 
made for hire codification schemes similar to Georgia’s, (3) large, 
incumbent legal research companies, and (4) SDOs. The positions of the 
states and legal research companies are addressed in this Section, while the 
positions of the government and SDOs are dealt with later in this Paper.   
The thirteen states,93 and the District of Columbia, that filed an 
amicus brief in favor of Georgia had, at one time or another, all claimed a 
copyright in their annotated codes.94 Their brief argued that the Eleventh 
Circuit’s ruling would upend the work made for hire arrangements that they 
relied on to contract with third-party annotators who recouped costs by 
selling the code.95 If their annotated codes did not enjoy copyright 
protection, then the annotators would charge states for producing the codes 
or halt production altogether.96 The effect of this would be to increase the 
costs on lawyers, who rely on annotated codes to begin their legal research.97 
Aside from the functionalist reasoning relied on by the states, State 
and D.C. amici also took the position that “[a]nnotations are not themselves 
the law, nor authoritative guidance on it.”98 This argument—at least with 
respect to the claim that the annotations do not provide authoritative 
guidance—is hard to square with the facts of Public.Resource.Org, where the 
Commission approved the annotations,99 and also with amici’s own 
argument that the annotations are “a starting point” that lawyers use to 
understand state law.100 Finally, the State and D.C. amici emphasized that 
the case law relied on by the Eleventh Circuit interpreted a practically 
ancient version of federal copyright statute and questioned whether it is still 
applicable under current law.101 For example, the State and D.C. amici noted 
that the Copyright Act expressly excludes works authored by the United 
States Government from copyright protection,102 but it contains no similar 
exclusion for state-authored works.103 
                                                           
93 Arkansas, Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. See Amicus Brief for Arkansas, et al., 
supra note 42, at *1. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at *3. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 43, at *52. 
100 Amicus Brief for Arkansas, et al., supra note 42, at *3. 
101 See id. at *4. (“[T]he theory behind [the government edicts doctrine] under existing 
copyright law . . . is unclear.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at *7–8. 
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The states’ position was reinforced by LexisNexis and the 
publishing amicus Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., which annotated the 
OCGA. The annotator stressed “the painstaking, creative efforts that [it] 
performed to create this work of authorship” and noted that it “follows a 
similar, time-consuming process to create annotations for many other 
States.”104 Furthermore, Matthew Bender & Co. contended that 
Public.Resource.Org’s actions not only infringed on Georgia’s valid 
copyright but that a ruling in the organization’s favor would “destroy the 
economic incentive for creating this deeply valuable work, while imposing 
needless costs on the public.”105 Citing case law, Matthew Bender & Co. 
urged the Court to consider the risks that such an outcome would have on 
“‘[t]he economic philosophy behind’ the Copyright Clause” of the 
Constitution.106   
Having established its interest in the case and articulated the harm 
that upholding the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling would have on private 
development of annotated codes, the legal research giant attacked the 
argument that the annotations were binding. First, Matthew Bender & Co. 
cited Georgia’s own code and state supreme court decisions, which “make 
clear that the Annotations have no ‘official weight[.]’”107 Second, to 
underscore this point, Matthew Bender & Co.  provided the following 
sample annotation, from the 2014 edition of the Annotations, for Cho 
Carwash Prop., LLC v. Everett, 755 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. 2014), and section 34-
9-260 of OCGA: 
Award of workers’ compensation benefits was upheld 
because there was some evidence to support the 
administrative law judge’s calculation of the claimant’s 
average weekly wage under [OCGA] § 34-9-260(3) based 
on the claimant’s testimony that the claimant was supposed 
to work from the car wash’s opening until its close.108 
As explained by Matthew Bender & Co., “[n]o part of the part of the above 
Annotation is Statutory Text or a judicial opinion, and it carries no force of 
law.”109 Third, Matthew Bender & Co. cited the plain text of Copyright Act 
itself, which protects annotations of “derivative work[s],”110 and provided 
nearly twenty examples of the U.S. Copyright Office registering state-owned 
                                                           
104 Brief for Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Georgia 
v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4235527, at 
*1 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Bender & Co.]. 
105 Id. at *2. 
106 Id. at *3 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
107 Id. at *2 (quoting Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm’n, 260 S.E.2d 30, 35 (Ga. 1979)). 
108 Id. at *6 (citations omitted). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at *14 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101, 103(a)). 
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annotations.111 Finally, it characterized the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis of the 
authoritativeness of the OCGA as an “unfocused inquiry, divorced from any 
holding or reasoning in Wheaton, Callaghan, and Banks or the 
Copyright Act’s text.”112 
 In effect, the states and incumbent legal research community 
regarded the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling as a departure from settled case law, 
the copyright statute, and the Copyright Office’s own longstanding practice. 
Both stressed the practical effects of upholding the circuit court’s decision 
on the publishing model that states and annotators had enjoyed. While they 
also agreed that the OCGA was not binding, a small fissure emerged over 
the authoritativeness of the annotations, with the states taking the position 
that the OCGA was not authoritative at all and LexisNexis arguing that 
authoritativeness was irrelevant to the inquiry altogether.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Public.Resource.Org Court faced the fundamental challenge 
of balancing the weight of its copyright precedents and the Copyright Act 
itself against the commercialization of legal materials113 and the principle of 
rule of law.114 Despite compelling facts and law on Georgia’s side (not to 
mention the two copyright heavyweights115 on the bench), the judicial interest 
in rule of law was too great to be confined by the Court’s prior decisions 
which, by themselves, favor a finding that the OCGA is copyrightable.116  
This Section considers why the Court chose to rely on the identity 
of the author to determine whether a particular work is an edict of 
government rather than the content of the work. Next, this Section 
addresses open questions left by the decision concerning what materials can 
be said to constitute law. Finally, this Section explores the (possibly 
unintended) impact of this case on privately authored works incorporated 
by reference117 into law.     
                                                           
111 Id. at *15–16. 
112 Id. at *23–24. 
113 See Street & Hansen, supra note 10, at 206 (“[P]ublishers now use powerful legal tools to 
control who has access to the text of the law, how much they must pay, and under what 
terms.”). 
114 See Overview - Rule of Law, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-
resources/educational-activities/overview-rule-law [https://perma.cc/QB8Q-J6D7]. 
115 See supra notes 60–63 (discussing Justices Ginsburg and Breyer). 
116 See Ed Krayewski, Official Law of Georgia is Copyrighted, and the State Enforces that 
Copyright, REASON (Mar. 31, 2017), https://reason.com/2017/03/31/official-law-of-georgia-
is-copyrighted-a/ [https://perma.cc/54L9-LFYH]. 
117 “[I]ncorporation by reference is a term of art for the practice of codifying material 
published elsewhere by simply referring to it in the text of a regulation.” Emily S. Bremmer, 
Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 
133 (2013). 
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A. Copyright Exclusions Based on Author  
While the long-term effect of the Public.Resource.Org ruling on 
commercial legal materials and state-sanctioned annotations is unclear, an 
immediate impact of the decision is the creation of an anomaly in modern 
copyright law in which certain works are ineligible for protection based on 
the judge-made legal fiction of constructive authorship.118 The Court’s focus 
in Public.Resource.Org on the identity of the author is consistent with the 
nineteenth-century case law that makes up the government edicts doctrine 
as applied to the nation’s eighteenth-century copyright statute.119 Yet, such 
focus reflects a departure from today’s code.  
The courts are generally wary of looking beyond the Copyright Act 
in assessing whether a particular work is entitled to protection. In Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court characterized “[t]he 
judiciary’s reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright 
without explicit legislative guidance” as “a recurring theme” in its copyright 
jurisprudence.120 Citing Wheaton, the Court in Sony Corp. went so far as to 
assert that “the protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory.”121  
The first federal Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1790 to 
protect the “author or authors” of certain works.122 Under its modern 
statutory construct, however, the Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright 
protection to “original works of authorship.”123 Thus, the original emphasis 
of copyright protection in the author now attaches instead to the author’s 
original works. With the sole exception of works authored by the U.S. 
Government, nowhere in the Copyright Act is a work of authorship denied 
copyright protection based on identity of the human author of the work.124 
Modern law categorically precludes any work of the U.S. 
Government from copyright protection.125 This limitation generally extends 
                                                           
118 See Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).  
119 See id. 
120 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (citing Teleprompter 
Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 
(1968); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Williams & 
Wilkins v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)). 
121 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 431. (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661–62 (1834)). 
122 Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).  
123 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
124 As explained by the U.S. Copyright Office, “the Office will refuse to register a claim if it 
determines that a human being did not create the work.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. PRACS. § 306 (3d ed. 2017) (emphasis added). 
125 17 U.S.C. § 105. This section of the 1976 Act carries forward a substantially similar 
prohibition in section 7 of the Copyright Act of 1909, which provided that “[n]o copyright 
shall subsist . . . in any publication of the United States Government . . . .”An Act to Amend 
and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (as passed by Congress 
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to works made for hire.126 As explained in the House Report accompanying 
the 1976 rewrite of the Copyright Act, “[S]ection 105 is intended to place 
all works of the United States Government, published or unpublished, in 
the public domain.”127 According to the U.S. Copyright Office, this “includes 
legislation enacted by Congress, decisions issued by the federal judiciary, 
regulations issued by a federal agency, or any other work prepared by an 
officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the 
course of his or her official duties.”128 Furthermore, “[a]s a matter of 
longstanding public policy, the U.S. Copyright Office will not register a 
government edict that has been issued by any state, local, or territorial 
government, including legislative enactments, judicial decisions, 
administrative rulings, public ordinances, or similar types of official legal 
materials.”129 
While the courts generally refrain from increasing the scope of 
copyright protection to subject matters without a statutory basis, one cannot 
help but notice that there is no language in the Copyright Act to limit 
protection for works authored by state legislators like there is for U.S. 
Government-authored works. Section 105 of the Copyright Act essentially 
codifies Wheaton but does not sweep in state edicts governed by Banks. 
Looked at through general principles of statutory interpretation, 
congressional silence on the copyrightability of works authored by the states 
draws a “negative inference: expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the 
inclusion of one is the exclusion of others).”130 When presented with the 
opportunity to legislate on the copyrightability of law generally, Congress 
surgically addressed federally authored works and chose to go no further.131 
To reason otherwise would amount to “enlargement” of the statute rather 
than “construction” of it,132 which Sony Corp. eschews. That the Copyright 
                                                           
Mar. 9, 1909), https://www.copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf [https://perma.cc/79RT-
B446]. 
126 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 58 (1976).  
127 Id. at 59.  
128 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 124, § 306. 
129 Id. § 313.6(C)(2). A policy innovation of the Copyright Act of 1976 is that registration of a 
copyright is not a prerequisite of protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 408. Thus, before the 
Public.Resource.Org ruling, the policy of the Copyright Office not to register government 
edicts issued by state, local, and territorial governments was not necessarily determinative of 
whether such works were protected by copyright law.  
130 LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RES. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GEN. PRINCIPLES AND 
RECENT TRENDS 18 (2014). 
131 See generally Preemption of a State Law Claim by Federal Copyright Act, 76 A.L.R.6TH 
289 (2012). 
132 Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926); see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 
U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (“[T]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ 
silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.”) (citing 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 98 S. Ct. 210 (1978)). 
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Office refuses to register state government edicts supports this point, since 
its refusal was based on policy—not on law. 
In its brief for the Court, Public.Resource.Org claimed that the 
OCGA is simply not a work of authorship because it is a government edict.133 
Presented with this argument by one of the parties, the Court could have 
performed an analysis of the annotations to determine whether they are 
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”134 
If the Court had applied that analysis, the Court would have likely found 
that the annotations fall into the category of literary works and then 
proceeded to consider whether the OCGA is sufficiently original.135 A 
finding of originality would then lead the Court to consider whether the 
original work is nevertheless covered by an exception in the statute, such as 
the general prohibition on extending copyright protection “to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.”136 Instead, the Court declined to even consider whether the 
OCGA is a work of authorship, likely because the annotations satisfy the 
prima facie elements required to be copyrightable.137 
The majority in Public.Resource.Org also elected not to evaluate 
either the binding effect or the authoritativeness of the OCGA, despite 
amici’s intense focus on those two prongs for purposes of analyzing the work 
as a government edict. In fact, the Court expressly rejected this approach, 
which was a factor employed by the Eleventh Circuit.138  
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning hews closely to the Robert’s 
opinion insofar as it “rel[ied] on the identity of the public officials who 
created the works” in question, however, the circuit court did not rely on 
authorship alone in its analysis.139 In this sense, the appellate court was 
“guided by a consideration of those characteristics that are the hallmarks of 
[copyright] law” and not just one element.140 The significance of the 
                                                           
133 Brief of Respondent, supra note 43, at *2. 
134 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
135 The originality requirement is “the bedrock principle of copyright” and “the very premise 
of copyright law.” Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991) 
(citation omitted). “To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be . . . independently 
created by the author” and “possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Id. at 345. 
136 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 33, WORKS NOT 
PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT (2017). 
137 There are three distinct elements required to qualify as a copyrightable compilation: “(1) 
the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the selection, 
coordination, or arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation, by virtue of the 
particular selection, coordination, or arrangement, of an ‘original’ work of authorship.” Feist 
Publ’n, 499 U.S. at 357. 
138 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506 (2020). 
139 Code Revision Comm’n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 
F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). 
140 Id. 
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departure between the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court on this 
point cannot be overstated. This is because the Eleventh Circuit’s approach 
invites a broader and more thorough examination of whether a work of 
authorship is “law,” which might leave the door open for other “law-like” 
works to lose copyright protection.141  
All nine of the Justices agree with the fundamental principle that no 
one owns the law.142 The debate, then, was less about whether a state 
government can own the law than whether the annotations in question were 
government edicts.143 The majority’s use of a blunt framework to determine 
whether the annotations were covered by the government edicts doctrine—
by looking to the author, as opposed to the author’s work—is a pragmatic 
exercise in judicial efficiency. The holding favors certainty and predictability 
over the more nuanced analyses put forward by Justice Thomas and Justice 
Ginsburg. Yet the Court’s reasoning should disappoint 
Public.Resource.Org., the respondent, and many of the interested parties 
who favored the Eleventh Circuit’s approach. This is because the decision 
potentially leaves many law-like works that are privately authored and 
arguably carry the same or greater weight than annotations out of reach from 
the government edicts doctrine.  
B. What is Law? 
By examining the author alone to determine whether a work is a 
law, the majority in Public.Resource.Org sidestepped difficult questions at 
the heart of the government edicts doctrine. Chief among them: what is 
“law,” exactly?  
At the federal level, a bill passed by Congress cannot become a law 
without meeting the constitutional procedural requirements of 
bicameralism and presentment to the president.144 To determine whether 
these requirements have been met, the Court considers, inter alia, whether 
an action by the legislature is “essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”145 
It does so by analyzing if the action “had the purpose and effect of altering 
the legal rights, duties and relations of persons.”146 In Georgia, substantially 
similar requirements exist, and revisions to the OCGA itself require 
                                                           
141 Id. at 1233. 
142 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1507 (“The animating principle behind this rule 
is that no one can own the law.”). 
143 Id. at 1503. 
144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
145 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952, 960 (1983) (holding the legislative veto 
unconstitutional). 
146 Id. at 952. 
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bicameral support in the General Assembly before being presented to the 
governor.147  
However, passage of a bill that is signed by the chief executive does 
not end the inquiry. Those enacted bills are later scrutinized by judges and, 
in some cases, held to be unconstitutional.148 Thus, a measure codified into 
positive law may have no force or effect if it has been struck down by the 
courts even though it remains codified. Further, common law—the law 
created by judges—is binding without the aid of a statute passed by a 
legislature. Regulations promulgated by the executive branch, with or 
without the explicit direction of a legislative body, may be appropriately 
considered binding law.149 Non-binding guidance issued by an executive 
branch may even be factored into a person’s compliance with the law.150 
In Banks, the Court declared “the law, which, bind[s] every citizen,” 
uncopyrightable.151 Based on this, some supporters of Georgia’s position 
understood that to mean only law with direct binding effect is covered by 
government edicts doctrine.152 On the other hand, supporters of 
Public.Resource.Org generally stressed the authoritativeness of a 
government document to determine whether it is a law.153 Their claim is 
supported by Callaghan, which denied “copyright in the opinions of the 
judges, or in the work done by them in their official capacity as judges,”154 
suggesting that even dissenting opinions, which are by definition not binding 
law, are nevertheless covered by the doctrine. Black’s Law Dictionary 
satisfies either point of view, defining law as “[t]he regime that orders human 
activities and relations through systematic application of . . . force” or, in the 
alternative, “[t]he aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted 
legal principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and 
administrative action.”155  
As observed by Leslie A. Street and David R. Hansen, “[d]espite 
what appears to be a clear rule against copyright protection over the law, 
                                                           
147 GA. CONST. art. III, § 5, para. XIII (“All bills and all resolutions which have been passed 
by the General Assembly intended to have the effect of law shall become law if the Governor 
approves or fails to veto the same . . . .”) (emphasis added); GA. CODE. ANN. § 1-1-1. 
148 Cobb County v. Campbell, 350 S.E.2d 466, 467 (Ga. 1986).  
149 Exec. Order No. 13891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55235 (Oct. 9, 2019) (“Departments and agencies 
(agencies) in the executive branch adopt regulations that impose legally binding requirements 
on the public even though, in our constitutional democracy, only Congress is vested with the 
legislative power.”). 
150 Id. (“[A]gencies have sometimes used [guidance] inappropriately in attempts to regulate 
the public . . . [e]ven when accompanied by a disclaimer that it is non-binding.”). 
151 Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). 
152 See, e.g., Amicus Brief for Matthew Bender & Co., supra note 104, at 2. 
153 See, e.g., Amicus Brief for Next-Generation and Databases, supra note 84, at 1. 
154 Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617, 647 (1888) (emphasis added). 
155 Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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publishers continue to assert copyright[s]” in such materials.156 This 
dichotomy exists because notions of what “law” is are not universally 
accepted.157 For example, although there is no argument that legislators and 
judges make law, virtually any law student would point to the American Law 
Institute’s (ALI) Restatement of Torts158 and the Model Penal Code 
(MPC)159—which no state has adopted in its entirety—as “law.” This is 
because these “law-like” materials are tested on the bar exam.160 Moreover, 
the Restatement is frequently adopted, verbatim, in judicial opinions161 and 
the MPC. Even when adopted in modified form by a state’s legislature, it is 
used as a critical reference point to understand legislative intent and 
statutory construction.162 Notably, when these materials are referenced or 
adopted in case law, the ALI retains a copyright interest in material related 
to such work, such as those portions that are not expressly incorporated into 
the text of a judicial opinion.163 For example, comments and illustrations 
used to give meaning to the Restatement retain their copyright protection 
despite the fact that they could be critical to understanding the significance 
of a particular word or phrase in the Restatement as adopted by a court. 
However, because the ALI is not a legislator or a judge, it is not a judicial or 
legislative author under the majority’s view of the government edicts 
doctrine. This is in spite of the fact that the ALI’s works of authorship are, 
at least by some accounts, the “raw materials” of the law, which are critical 
to understanding its meaning, not unlike the annotations of Georgia’s 
official code.164      
It may seem obvious that the government edicts doctrine should 
only cover works authored by a government entity charged with making law. 
                                                           
156 Street & Hansen, supra note 10, at 222. 
157 Id. at 210. 
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (AM. L. INST.) (2013). 
159 See MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. L. INST.) (1962). 
160 See AdaptiBar, What Law Should I Apply on the MBE? (July 2, 2019), 
https://blog.adaptibar.com/what-law-apply-mbe/ [https://perma.cc/G5TZ-3ERY].  
161 See, e.g., Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009) (“[T]he 
[Restatement] drafters’ clarification of scope of liability sound . . . and, accordingly, adopt 
it.”). 
162 See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 50 (N.Y. 1986) (“New York[s] [refusal to] follow 
the Model Penal Code’s equation of a mistake as to the need to use deadly force” was the 
determinative factor in construing the state’s penal code). 
163 See, e.g., DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, Restatements and Non-State Codifications of Private 
Law, in CODIFICATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 75-90 (Wen-Yeu Wang ed., 2014) 
(noting that ALI owns a copyright in the Restatement as part of its long-lived joint venture 
with the West Publishing Company).  
164 American University Washington College of Law, Program on Information Justice and 
Intellectual Property, IP at the Supreme Court Series: Georgia v. Public.Resources.Org, Inc., 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OcposI6qZ-
E&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/JC54-CY6Q] (quoting panelist Joseph C. Gratz). 
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Yet that presupposes that everyone looks to the works of legislatures and 
judges alone to know the law. This one-dimensional approach to knowing 
the law bears little resemblance to reality. In fact, lawyers would commit 
legal malpractice if they looked to a statute alone to understand its true 
meaning.165 Street and Hansen identify three critical attributes that 
accompany “the law,” writing that “only an official, authentic and 
authoritative source is accorded the full weight of ‘the law.’”166 These three 
elements overlap to a large extent with the three “markers” used by the 
Eleventh Circuit to ascertain whether the OCGA was a government edict.167 
Neither approach relies exclusively on authorship to determine what is law.  
In Public.Resource.Org, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is a less 
expedient but more practical way of uncovering what is “law,” which both 
parties agreed cannot be copyrighted.168 This is because it creates space for 
the full gambit of law-like works not authored by legislators and judges to be 
freed from internet paywalls and terms of services and opened to public 
access so that every citizen may fulfill their duty to know the law.169 This not 
only accords with the needs and professional obligations of legal 
practitioners170 but also with pro se parties, amateurs, and other professionals 
                                                           
165 See, e.g., Carol M. Bast & Susan W. Harrell, Ethical Obligations: Performing Adequate 
Legal Research and Legal Writing, 29 NOVA L. REV. 49, 49 (2004) (“Failure to adequately 
research or write well, or both, is a violation of ethics rules and can result in a reprimand, 
suspension, or disbarment from the practice of law; a client may decide that it is the basis of 
a legal malpractice lawsuit.”); Daniel E. Pinnington, The Biggest Malpractice Risks, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2011/march/the_biggest_
malpractice_claim_risks/ [https://perma.cc/K63L-W9CF] (failing to know or apply 
substantive law is the most common malpractice error that a lawyer can commit); Sarah 
Lamdan, When Westlaw Fuels ICE Surveillance: Legal Ethics in the Era of Big Data 
Policing, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 284 (2019) (“Lawyers need computer-
assisted legal research to do their jobs, as proper legal research is necessary to avoid 
malpractice.”). 
166 Street & Hansen, supra note 10, at 211. 
167 Code Revision Comm’n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 906 
F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018). 
168 Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) 
(No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4075096 (“[T]he law itself is not copyrightable.”); Brief of 
Respondent, supra 43, at *1 (“[L]egal works ‘published under the authority of’ the State are 
not the proper subject of private copyright.” (quoting Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 649–
50 (1888)). 
169 See Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559, 560 (1886) (“Every citizen is presumed to know the law 
thus declared, and it needs no argument to show that justice requires that all should have free 
access to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress 
and keep from the earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the decisions and opinions 
of the justices.”). 
170 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, Preamble 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (“As a member of 
a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, 
employ that knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education.”). 
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striving for legal compliance in their jobs and daily lives.171 Although less 
“straightforward” than the Court’s “just look to the author” approach, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s markers are more consistent with the Copyright Act and 
the Court’s historical approach to determining copyrightability based on the 
work itself, rather than the work’s author. 
C. Implications for Technical Manuals, Standards, Building Codes, and 
Other Law-Like Materials 
While Public.Resource.Org can understandably be pleased with 
the ruling in its favor, the Roberts opinion may have a limiting (if not fatal) 
impact on separate pending litigation to which Public.Resource.Org is a 
party.172 In American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) v. 
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., private organizations that develop technical 
standards later incorporated by reference into law sued 
Public.Resource.Org for copyright and trademark infringement after it 
distributed those standards on the internet.173  
Although these standards may be “boring [and] technical,”174 the fact 
is that “Federal, state, and local governments . . . have incorporated by 
reference thousands of these standards into law.”175 As a result of copyright 
restrictions, these privately created, nongovernment works are sometimes 
only accessible at a cost and may not be copied or shared with others.176 Yet, 
many of these works carry equal weight to statutes since they have the 
binding force of law.177  
Through public-private partnerships, hundreds of private SDOs 
develop technical and industry-specific standards in the United States, many 
of which are followed by the government at the federal, state, and local 
level.178 In fact, federal statute and executive branch policy promote the 
adoption of these privately authored works into federal laws and 
                                                           
171 See LawResourceOrg, Show Me the Manual, YOUTUBE (July 14, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tOJdGaMvVw [https://perma.cc/QCX6-KLT2] 
[hereinafter Show Me the Manual]. 
172 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 458 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018) (vacating permanent injunctions against defendant, Public.Recourse.Org, Inc., 
and reversing district court’s denial of summary judgement against defendant’s fair use 
defense claim under the Copyright Act). 
173 Id. at 444. 
174 Show Me the Manual, supra note 171. 
175 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 896 F.3d at 440. 
176 Show Me the Manual, supra note 171. 
177 Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 896 F.3d at 440. 
178 The Scope of Copyright Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop. 
& the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1–2 (2014) (statement of 
Patricia Griffin, Vice President and General Counsel, American National Standards 
Institute) [hereinafter Griffin]. 
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regulations.179 In 1995, Congress passed the National Technology Transfer 
and Advancement Act which directs “all Federal agencies and departments 
[to] use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary 
consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to 
carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and 
departments.”180 As of August 2016, over 24,000 standards were 
incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal Regulation.181 This 
represents a 250 percent increase in the number of privately developed 
standards incorporated by reference over a four year period.182  
Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), federal 
agencies must publish in the Federal Register “substantive rules of general 
applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy 
or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the 
agency.”183 This mandate, which serves as a means of public notice—a key 
requirement under the principle of the rule of law184—may be achieved when 
privately authored standards are incorporated by reference.185 According to 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), incorporation 
by reference is “used primarily to make privately developed technical 
standards Federally enforceable” and has the legal effect of treating the 
material “as if it were published in the Federal Register and [Code of 
Federal Regulations].”186  
Under implementing regulations, federal agencies must summarize 
the material to be incorporated by reference in the rulemaking process and 
“[d]iscuss, in the preamble of the final rule, the ways that the materials it 
incorporates by reference are reasonably available to interested parties and 
                                                           
179 Id.  
180 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 
12(d)(1), 110 Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 3701 note); see also OFF. OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, REVISED, FEDERAL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS 
AND IN CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES (1998) (“All federal agencies must use 
voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards in their procurement 
and regulatory activities, except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical.”) 
[hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119]. 
181 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., STANDARDS INC. BY REFERENCE DATABASE, 
https://sibr.nist.gov/ [https://perma.cc/6V2A-KUBH] (“This database has not been updated 
since August 16, 2016 and is being provided as a source for historical data.”). 
182 Compare id. with Bremmer, supra note 117, at 150. 
183 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2021). 
184Overview - Rule of Law, supra note 114 (“Rule of law is a principle under which all persons, 
institutions, and entities are accountable to laws that are: [p]ublicly promulgated . . . .”). 
185 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). 
186 Code of Federal Regulations Incorporation by Reference, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES AND REC. 
ADMIN.: FED. REG., (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-
locations.html [https://perma.cc/H8NA-BA6L]. 
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how interested parties can obtain the materials.”187 The term “interested 
parties” deviates from the statute itself, which directs that matters required 
to be published in the Federal Register be made “reasonably available to the 
class of persons affected thereby.”188 As explained by NARA, which 
declined to define the term “class of persons,” this subtle change “could be 
read as an indication that the [material incorporated by reference] must be 
reasonably available to those who must directly comply with the 
regulation.”189 During the rulemaking process, comments were submitted to 
NARA encouraging the agency to make these materials available to any 
person, but the agency noted that FOIA makes it “acceptable to have 
material reasonably available beyond the class of persons affected but it is 
not required.”190  
The Federal Incorporation by Reference Rule’s reasonable 
availability requirement represents a balance between U.S. copyright law, 
U.S. international trade obligations, and agencies’ ability to substantively 
regulate under their authorizing statutes.191 Although not directly addressed 
in statutory law, executive branch policy expressly directs federal agencies 
to “observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder[s]” when a 
voluntary standard “is used and published in an agency document.”192 While 
NARA takes the position that “when the Federal government references 
copyrighted works, those works should not lose their copyright,”193 case law 
not yet considered by the Supreme Court suggests a more nuanced rule 
emerging from the lower courts. It is unclear whether the rule pronounced 
by the Court in Public.Resource.Org augments or displaces the lower 
courts’ incorporation by reference jurisprudence.  
In Building Officials & Code Administration v. Code Technology, 
Inc., the First Circuit considered whether the principle “that judicial 
opinions and statutes are in the public domain and are not subject to 
copyright” applied to “state-promulgated administrative regulations which 
are modelled on a privately developed code.”194 Building Officials and Code 
Administration (BOCA), a private SDO, developed building codes which 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted into its law, with minor state-
specific modifications.195 After Code Technology, Inc. copied the official 
code from state sources and redistributed the material, BOCA obtained a 
                                                           
187 1 C.F.R. § 51.5(a)(1) (2015). 
188 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). 
189 Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66276 (Nov. 7, 2014). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, supra note 180. 
193 Incorporation by Reference, supra note 189. 
194 Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980). 
195 Id. at 731. 
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preliminary injunction from a trial court to prevent further distribution of 
the material.196 Amid extensive exploration of the government edicts 
doctrine, the First Circuit reversed, claiming (unconvincingly) that its ruling 
was not based upon the underlying legal issues.197  
BOCA argued that section 105 of the Copyright Act, which 
expressly disclaims copyright abridgement by the Federal Government’s 
own publication of copyright material, creates a state analogy whereby “a 
state’s use of copyrighted material cannot affect its copyright protection.”198 
The circuit court characterized this argument as a “misunderstanding” of 
congressional intent.199 Comparing section 8 of the 1909 copyright statute, 
which barred “any publication of the United States government” from 
copyright protection, to section 105 of the new Act, which excludes from 
copyright protection any “work of the United States government”—a defined 
term in the statute—the court concluded that Congress had specifically 
sought to ameliorate the “danger” created by the ambiguity of the 1909 law 
“that privately written and copyrighted works would lose protection simply 
by inclusion in a government publication.”200 Thus, the court found “section 
105 of the Federal Copyright Act, and its predecessor section 8 of the old 
Act, do not protect BOCA’s material against the loss of its copyright 
protection through adoption as state law.”201 Critically, the court also 
distinguished the adoption of copyright material into law “from mere 
publication by the government.”202 
More than a decade after the First Circuit’s decision, the Second 
Circuit considered a fact pattern which it decided was clearly too 
comparable to a government’s mere reference to a work of authorship for 
such work to be considered an edict of government. In CCC Information 
Services, Inc. (CCC) v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Maclean appealed 
a judgement by a lower court that its Automobile Red Book—Official Used 
Car Valuations (the “Red Book”) was uncopyrightable.203 CCC, the alleged 
infringer of the work, provided customers with automobile valuations based 
on the Red Book, which was also used under the laws of several states to 
calculate minimum insurance payments for the “total loss” of a vehicle.204 
                                                           
196 Id. at 731–32. 
197 See generally id. at 732–36. Despite claiming to “leave the door slightly ajar” with respect 
to the legal merits, the court was unmistakably clear that BOCA’s works were government 
edicts ineligible for copyright protection. Id. at 736. 
198 Id. at 735. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 736. 
202 Id. at 735. 
203 CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 63 (2d 
Cir. 1994). 
204 Id. at 64. 
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Distinguishing the case before it from Building Officials & Code 
Administration, the Second Circuit reversed the court below and concluded 
that Maclean had a valid copyright, stating that it was “not prepared to hold 
that a state’s reference to a copyrighted work as a legal standard for valuation 
results in loss of the copyright” despite compelling “policy considerations 
that support CCC’s argument.”205 
The Ninth Circuit considered another incorporation by reference 
from a case in 1997 involving a medical procedure code developed by the 
American Medical Association (AMA).206 Pursuant to an act of Congress 
requiring the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to establish a 
uniform code for identifying physicians’ services for use in completing 
Medicare and Medicaid claim forms, HCFA contracted with the AMA to 
use its privately-developed code.207 After the code was incorporated by 
reference into HCFA rules through the Code of Federal Regulations, 
Practice Management, a publisher and distributor of medical books, sought 
declaratory judgement that the AMA authored code lost its copyright 
protection once incorporated by reference in HFCA regulations.208  
Like the First Circuit in BOCA and the Second Circuit in CCC, the 
Ninth Circuit was unwilling to abrogate the AMA’s copyright protection due 
to the mere reference of its code in federal regulations.209 Moreover, the 
court reasoned that there was no evidence that incorporation by reference 
limited public access to the AMA’s code210 and agreed with the AMA that 
“invalidating its copyright on the ground that the [code] entered the public 
domain when HCFA required its use would expose copyrights on a wide 
range of privately authored model codes, standards, and reference works to 
invalidation.”211 This, the court explained, would undermine the purpose of 
copyright to promote the arts and sciences.212 
In a more recent appeals court case, Veeck v. Southern Building 
Code Congress, Inc., the Fifth Circuit considered “the extent to which a 
private organization may assert copyright protection for its model codes, 
after the models have been adopted by a legislative body and become ‘the 
                                                           
205 Id. at 74. 
206 Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997). 
207 Id. at 517. HCFA is now known as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). 
HCFA Becomes CMS, EMERGENCY MED. NEWS (Sept. 2001), https://journals.lww.com/em-
news/fulltext/2001/09000/hcfa_becomes_cms.18.aspx#:~:text=The%20Health%20Care%2
0Financing%20Administration,and%20Medicaid%20Services%20 [https://perma.cc/TSV8-
X6ZX].   
208 Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp., 121 F.3d at 518. 
209 See id. at 519–20. 
210 Id. at 519. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 518. 
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law.’”213 The controversy arose when Veeck, a private website operator, 
posted the building codes of two Texas municipalities, which were based on 
a model code developed by Southern Building Code Congress 
International, Inc. (SBCCI).214  
In a split decision, the court determined that “SBCCI is the ‘author’ 
of model building codes that, qua model building codes, are facially 
copyright-protected.”215 Nevertheless, the court held that “as law, the model 
codes enter the public domain and are not subject to the copyright holder’s 
exclusive prerogatives.”216 The majority explained that under the merger 
doctrine, the codes became ineligible for copyright protection once the 
work was incorporated into the cities’ municipal code.217 The court 
distinguished its ruling from other cases based on the important fact that the 
code in Veeck was “promoted by its author, SBCCI, precisely for use as 
legislation,”218 whereas “other voluntary consensus standards are usually 
‘created by private groups for reasons other than incorporation into law.’”219 
According to Emily S. Bremmer, “Veeck and related cases show 
that the scope of copyright protection for privately authored materials used 
in the law depends upon a variety of factors, including the nature of the 
material at issue, the purpose for which it was created, and the way the 
government uses it.”220 For example, the government’s mere reference to a 
privately authored work incorporated by reference into law does not 
automatically invalidate its copyright. On the other hand, wholesale 
adoption of privately authored works into law may cause it to lose copyright 
protection as law, especially if the law is binding on the public.221 
Furthermore, whether the government participates in the standards 
development process and whether the SDO promotes the adoption of its 
works into law are also relevant factors in assessing the copyrightability of 
the material.  
                                                           
213 293 F.3d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
214 Id. at 801. 
215 Id. at 800.  
216 Id. at 793 (emphasis in original). 
217 Id. at 801–02. “If an idea is susceptible to only one form of expression, the merger doctrine 
applies and § 102(b) excludes the expression from the Copyright Act. As the Supreme Court 
has explained it, this ‘idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the 
First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while 
still protecting an author’s expression.’” Id. at 801 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).  
218 Id. at 804 (citing CCC Info. Services v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 
(2nd Cir.1994); Practice Management Info. Corp. v. American Medical Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 
(9th Cir. 1997), opinion amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
219 Bremmer, supra note 117, at 169 (quoting Veeck, 293 F.3d at 804–05). 
220 Id.  
221 See id.   
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 Considering Public.Resource.Org’s mission and history, it is not 
surprising that it, too, is involved in a dispute over the copyrightability of 
privately authored standards incorporated by reference into law. In ASTM, 
Malamud’s organization was sued by six SDOs for publishing hundreds of 
their privately-authored standards on the internet.222 The trial court granted 
partial summary judgement in favor of the SDOs and issued injunctions to 
prevent Public.Resource.Org from redistributing the works.223 On appeal, 
the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the lower court did 
not properly consider Public.Resource.Org’s fair use defense, “and le[ft] for 
another day the question of whether the Constitution permits copyright to 
persist in works incorporated by reference into law.”224 
Although the court of appeals did not reach a conclusion on the 
merits of Public.Resource.Org’s claim that the SDO’s standards were 
uncopyrightable, the court considered the various jurisdictional processes 
by which works are incorporated by reference into law and also the varying 
legal consequences of incorporation.225 Depicting the process and its 
consequences as a spectrum, the court found that “[a]t one end of this 
spectrum lie incorporated standards that define one’s legal obligations . . . 
except that the specific legal requirements are found outside the two covers 
of the codebook.”226 On “the other end of the spectrum lie standards that 
serve as mere references but have no direct legal effect on any private party’s 
conduct.”227 This analysis gives a subtle nod to the reasoning used by circuit 
courts in other incorporation by reference cases, including BOCA, CCC, 
and Veeck. Also, like the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Public.Resource.Org, 
it makes for at least the fourth circuit court to evaluate the copyrightability 
of law and law-like works in terms of the process of its creation and its 
authoritativeness or binding effect.228 This is in stark contrast to the Supreme 
Court’s approach of determining copyright protection based solely on the 
identity of the author. 
Public.Resource.Org’s victory at the Supreme Court may come at 
the expense of losing this separate but related legal fight. Had the majority 
in Public.Resource.Org adopted the “three marker” test used by the 
Eleventh Circuit, Public.Resource.Org might be on stronger footing in its 
campaign to free technical standards carrying the force of law from copyright 
restrictions. In fact, many organizations that filed briefs in support of 
                                                           
222 Am. Soc’y for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. 896 F.3d 437 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). 
223 Id. at 440. 
224 Id. at 447. 
225 Id. at 441–42. 
226 Id. at 442–43. 
227 Id. at 443. 
228 See generally id. 
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Georgia229 out of concern that the Court might adopt a broader rule 
sweeping in these legal materials should be pleased that the majority’s 
opinion may have put those materials entirely out of scope of the 
government edicts doctrine before ever hearing a case on the matter. This 
is so because privately authored works adopted by reference into legislative 
enactments only satisfy one of the Court’s two requirements under the rule 
adopted by the majority in Public.Resource.Org.230 Here, again, 
“authorship” is the critical factor. Because organizations like the American 
Society for Testing and Materials are not legislators or judges, the rule 
adopted in Public.Resource.Org would likely preclude the government 
edicts doctrine from applying to their works of authorship once 
incorporated into administrative regulations.  
Assuming that these types of works retain copyright protection and 
do not fall under the government edicts doctrine, there are two likely ways 
to open access to this information. Legislatures could enact these standards 
in their entirety (as opposed to adoption by reference), in which case they 
would likely lose their copyright protection. Alternitively, parties could 
assert a fair use defense. Both approaches have drawbacks.  
Prior to the Court’s decision in Public.Resource.Org, Malamud 
confidently argued that “even if the law is created by a private party, once it 
is enacted as the law of the land, anybody can make copies.”231 The 
Public.Resource.Org Court’s decision proves Malamud wrong.232 
Government copying of privately authored original work—even when 
adopted into law—would likely constitute a “taking” of private property for 
public use under the Takings Clause of the Constitution, which would 
require the government to pay just compensation.233 Some argue that this 
                                                           
229 See, e.g., Brief for American Society for Testing and Materials d/b/a/ ASTM International 
(“ASTM”) as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 
S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4192161; Brief for International Code Council, 
Inc. and the American Gas Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Georgia v. 
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150), 2019 WL 4235528 
[hereinafter Amicus Brief for Int’l Code Council & Am. Gas Ass'n]. 
230 See Public.Resource.Org, 140 S Ct. at 1508.  
231 Carl Malamud, Three Revolutions in American Law, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG (Oct. 22–
23, 2009) (“A good example of this are our public safety codes: the building codes, fire codes, 
electrical, plumbing, boiler, fuel & gas, and the other codes that govern our daily lives.”). 
232 See Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1506 (holding that the government edicts 
doctrine “does not apply . . . to works created by government officials (or private parties) 
who lack the authority to make or interpret the law . . . .”). 
233 U.S. CONST. amend V. Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 
243, 250–51 (1833). However, under the incorporation doctrine, portions of the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution are applicable to the states through the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the late 19th Century, the Court ruled that when 
“private property is taken for the state or under its direction for public use, without 
31
Taylor: Copyright Law Cannot Copyright Law—Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
1008 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
would undermine the purpose of copyright altogether because it would 
create a disincentive for standards-setting bodies and other private parties 
from developing model codes for which they have a “unique” and 
specialized expertise to “develop very technical areas of the law,” like fire 
and building safety.234 However, others have suggested that “any Takings 
Clause problem evaporates if the copyright owner has encouraged or 
permitted the government entity to incorporate the copyrighted work into 
its laws.”235 The Copyright Act itself states: 
When an individual author’s ownership of a copyright . . . 
has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that 
individual author, no action by any governmental body or 
other official or organization purporting to seize, 
expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with 
respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under 
a copyright, shall be given effect. 236 
Although “[t]here is no strict formula assessing a Takings Clause 
claim,”237 the Supreme Court has identified (1) “[t]he economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the 
character of the governmental action” as “several factors that have particular 
significance.”238 The Veeck court found neither a Copyright Act nor a 
Taking Clause violation “because SBCCI urged localities to adopt its model 
codes.”239 Thus, the issue in cases involving governmental adoption of 
model codes “is not the voluntariness of the appropriation but the legal 
consequences flowing from the permission” that SBCCI gave.240 
                                                           
compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the 
due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United 
States.” Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
As recently observed by a unanimous Court, “[c]opyrights are a form of property.” Allen v. 
Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 128 
(1932)). 
234 American University Washington College of Law, Program on Information Justice and 
Intellectual Property, IP at the Supreme Court Series: Georgia v. Public.Resources.Org, Inc., 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OcposI6qZ-
E&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/8HXF-DE7D] (comment by panelist Amy Chai). 
235 Amicus Brief for Int’l Code Council & Am. Gas Ass’n, supra note 229, at 15 (citing Veeck 
v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc. 293 F.3d 791, 803 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). 
236 17 U.S.C. § 201(e). This section of the Copyright Act applies narrowly to copyrights owned 
by individuals, rather than SDOs. 
237 Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).  
238 Penn. Ct. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
239 Veeck, 293 F.3d at 803. 
240 Int’l Code Council, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *14 (quoting Veeck, 
293 F.3d at 794, 803).  
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Regardless, this debate may be purely academic because of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Allen v. Cooper, another copyright case decided 
a month before Public.Resource.Org. In that case, the Court held that an 
act of Congress abrogating states’ immunity from copyright infringement 
suits was unconstitutional, despite the legislature’s clear language.241 The 
ruling therefore calls into question what effective remedy a SDO would have 
against government copying of protected works of original authorship into 
state statutes and regulation. Although private persons could still seek 
injunctive relief against a state for copyright infringement, it is hard to 
imagine the judicial branch interfering with a state legislature’s ability to 
make laws.242 Based on the Court’s reasoning in Allen,243 it appears likely that 
Congress would have to identify a pattern of states infringing on copyrights 
through state laws and provide for a narrow cause of action against the states 
tailored toward such behavior in order to pass muster under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Alternatively, these standards could be copied without constituting 
infringement under the fair use doctrine,244 “which permits unauthorized 
copying in some circumstances, so as to further copyright’s very purpose, 
‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”245 However, as the 
Roberts opinion notes in Public.Resource.Org, “that defense, designed to 
accommodate First Amendment concerns, is notoriously fact sensitive and 
often cannot be resolved without a trial.”246 This is because the application 
of the fair use doctrine depends on the use of a multifactor test that weighs 
all factors in light of the circumstances.247  
                                                           
241 Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (“[T]he balance the [Copyright Clarification 
Remedy Act] strike[s] between constitutional wrong and statutory remedy is . . . askew” under 
the Court’s “congruence and proportionality” test for determining whether a state’s sovereign 
immunity can be overcome by proper congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).  
242 In response to a request from members of the House Judiciary Committee, the United 
States Register for Copyrights reported to Congress that “injunctive relief, which would be 
the only remedy available in copyright infringement cases against states if states have Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, is inadequate as a deterrence to copyright infringement.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 101–282, at 3 (1989) (quoting REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF 
STATES iv (1988)). 
243 140 S. Ct. at 1003–07. 
244 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
245 Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8).  
246 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1513 (2020) (citing Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985)). 
247 See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 804 F.3d 202, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The statute 
‘calls for case-by-case analysis’” and recognizing that “some of the statute’s four listed [fair 
use] factors are more significant than others.”) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577). 
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In ASTM, the D.C. Circuit considered three factors relevant to a 
fair use analysis in the context of works incorporated by reference into law. 
First, where an SDO makes copies of its standards online in a “controlled 
reading room,” how much additional harm does the alleged infringer cause 
to the market of such standards?248 Second, “wholesale copying may be 
unjustified if a law incorporates by reference only a few select provisions of 
a much longer standard.”249 And finally, “how, if at all, does the infringement 
affect the market for derivative works, particularly considering that the 
standards are regularly updated and that the private parties most interested 
in the standards would presumably remain interested in having the most up-
to-date ones?”250 
At least one incorporation by reference case decided a month after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Public.Resource.Org analyzed an SDO’s 
copyright infringement claim using several guideposts beyond mere 
authorship, suggesting that the Court’s ruling may not go so far as to occupy 
the incorporation by reference field as the author of this Paper believes it 
might. In International Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., the Southern 
District of New York considered a copyright infringement claim by the 
International Code Council (ICC), a SDO founded by three predecessor 
SDOs which merged in 1994, including SBCCI, against a web-based startup 
that provides “easy and convenient access to materials of particular 
importance to members of the architecture, engineering, and construction 
(‘AEC’) industries.”251  
Like in Veeck, the ICC produced model codes which were adopted 
into law through a multi-step process which “involves significant 
participation by government representatives, who compose at least one-third 
of each committee and vote on important decisions regarding changes to 
the model codes.”252 On cross-motions for summary judgement, the trial 
court considered the relevant case law, including the Public.Resource.Org 
and Veeck decisions, from which it summarized five “guideposts to assess 
whether notice of the purported copyrighted work is needed for a person to 
have notice of ‘the law,’” including: 
(1) whether the private author intended or encouraged the 
work’s adoption into law; (2) whether the work 
comprehensively governs public conduct, such that it 
resembles a ‘law of general applicability’; (3) whether the 
                                                           
248 Am. Soc’y for Testing and Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. 896 F.3d 437, 453 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018). 
249 Id. 
250 Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *27 
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020) (citing Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials, 896 F.3d at 453).  
251 Id. at *3.  
252 Id. at *2. 
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work expressly regulates a broad area of private endeavor; 
(4) whether the work provides penalties or sanctions for 
violation of its contents; and (5) whether the alleged 
infringer has published and identified the work as part of 
the law, rather than the copyrighted material underlying the 
law.253 
It is curious why the district court did not end its analysis by 
concluding that the works are protected by copyright since they were simply 
developed by a private party. Rather than limiting its analysis to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Public.Resource.Org that the government edicts doctrine 
“does not apply . . . to works created by government officials (or private 
parties) who lack the authority to make or interpret the law,”254 the court 
thought it significant that “these laws incorporate significant amounts of 
material authored by a private entity rather than by government officials 
empowered to speak with the force of law,” and therefore presented “an 
unusual fact pattern that the author-focused Government Edicts doctrine 
does not directly address.”255 Instead, the court was guided by the “animating 
principle” articulated in Public.Resource.Org that “‘no one can own the 
law’”256 and may have been persuaded that the fact pattern before it was more 
like BOCA, CCC, and Veeck. This led it to conclude that the work was 
uncopyrightable because it was more than merely referenced into law and 
because the process by which the standards were created involved 
government officials.257 In other words, the multifactor approach taken by 
the Eleventh Circuit may have felt to the district court like a more complete 
and satisfying analysis through which to frame its decision than the Supreme 
Court’s author-only reasoning.   
Regardless of how the UpCode case proceeds, a key consideration 
for SDOs following Public.Resource.Org is whether and to what extent 
government officials are involved in the standards-development process. In 
testimony before Congress, the representative of one SDO membership 
organization touted that “federal, state, and local governments are active 
partners in the development of standards and codes.”258 At least in part, this 
is because federal law and White House policy not only encourage but, in 
fact, mandate participation259 of federal agency officials in the development 
                                                           
253 Id. at *16. 
254 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1507 (2020) (emphasis added). 
255 Upcodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *8. 
256 Id. (quoting Public.Resource.Org, 140 S. Ct. at 1507). 
257 Id. at *10–13. 
258 Griffin, supra note 178. 
259 “Federal agencies and departments shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus 
standards bodies and shall, when such participation is in the public interest and is compatible 
with agency and departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources, 
participate with such bodies in the development of technical standards.” National 
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of voluntary standards “when consultation and participation is in the public 
interest and is compatible with their missions, authorities, priorities, and 
budget resources.”260  
Despite federal encouragement, under the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Public.Resource.Org, the greater the participation of government 
officials, the more likely the work would be considered uncopyrightable 
based on the identity of the author. 261 This was observed by the court in 
UpCode, which noted with particularity the fact that nearly one-third of the 
ICC’s committees were comprised of government representatives who also 
wielded votes on important decisions about the development of the codes.262 
While it remains to be seen whether and to what extent the level or amount 
of participation by government officials in the development of standards 
incorporated by reference into law is material to analyzing whether the 
standards are a work of authorship by the government, it is possible that 
either the Copyright Act263 or recent case law could be used to conclude that 
too much government involvement would render the material 
uncopyrightable. In the alternative, a strict reading of the Court’s holding 
limits the scope of the doctrine to judges and legislators, which would leave 
administrative law promulgated by regulators out of scope.  
Had the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the government edicts 
doctrine been upheld by the Supreme Court, there is a greater likelihood 
that other privately authored materials carrying the force of law might lose 
copyright protection. Without relying on authorship alone, courts would be 
free to conclude that the binding effect or authoritativeness of a privately 
authored work bears a close enough resemblance to traditional notions of 
law to be edicts of government. Instead, under a strict reading of the Court’s 
ruling, many privately authored standards incorporated by reference into 
law will retain their copyright protection unless the Court’s ruling 
supplements rather than supersedes the circuit courts’ incorporation by 
                                                           
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113, § 11(d)(2), 110 
Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701). 
260 OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-119, supra note 180; see also SUBCOMMITTEE ON STANDARDS, 
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, Federal Engagement in 
Standards Activities to Address National Priorities: Background and Proposed 
Recommendations (Oct. 10, 2011) (“Agencies should consider participating in standard-
setting activities in order to maintain awareness of emerging revisions.”). 
261 At a minimum, the Court’s ruling in Public.Resource.Org covers judges and legislators. It 
appears likely that other government officials in administrative agencies, for example, could 
also covered based on the First Circuit’s decision in BOCA. 
262 Int’l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-06261, 2020 WL 2750636, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020). 
263 See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (excluding works of the United States Government from copyright 
protection). This restriction under the Copyright Act is not applicable to state or local 
government officials. 
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reference jurisprudence. By not addressing this directly, the Court leaves 
unresolved the future of public access to these law-like materials. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s expansion of the government edicts 
doctrine in Public.Resource.Org should reassure those who believe that no 
one can own the law. The majority appropriately decided that all works 
authored by legislators and judges acting in their official capacity are not 
copyrightable. This is a victory for open access to the law and will hopefully 
encourage states and other jurisdictions with the power to enact laws to 
make government edicts and “law-like” materials recognized under their 
laws widely available. This could promote greater citizen understanding of 
the law and a more learned society. 
Despite the generally positive result of Public.Resource.Org, the 
Supreme Court only partially moved the needle for those who would like 
to promote greater access to the law and other legal materials. The Eleventh 
Circuit’s “three marker” test for determining whether a work is sufficiently 
law-like to lose copyright protection was more in line with the Copyright Act 
and offered advocates for open access to the “raw materials” of the law a 
better chance at furthering pending cases that would break down legal 
barriers to the law.  
By looking at the author alone to determine whether a work is a 
government edict, the diverse group of Justices that sided with 
Public.Resources.Org overemphasized one element of the Copyright Act to 
the exclusion of others. The full impact of their ruling will not be known for 
some time, but it may give comfort to technical standards-setting bodies and 
other private groups that copyright works later incorporated into law. 
Unfortunately for Public.Resource.Org and other advocates for open access 
to the law, the Roberts opinion might be construed as leaving those works 
out of scope of the government edicts doctrine. 
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